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U.N. Council Gets Evidence Of Illicit Iraqi Arms Buildup

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The head of the United Nations team disarming **Iraq** went to the Security Council today armed with photographs, documents and a team of experts to demonstrate that Baghdad continues to pose a threat in almost every area of weapons development and cannot hope to be free of sanctions if it does not cooperate with inspectors.

The presentation by the official, Richard Butler, executive chairman of the United Nations Special Commission, appeared to be intended to harden the resolve of the Council as foreign ministers of the United States, Britain, France and Russia met in Geneva to consider a diplomatic way out of the crisis.

No arms inspections have taken place in **Iraq** since Oct. 29, when Baghdad first threatened to expel Americans on the monitoring teams, a threat finally carried out on Nov. 13. Mr. Butler pulled all other inspectors out the next day.

The experts who briefed the Council today summarized where the investigation into **Iraq's** biological, chemical and missile programs stood at this point. They also explained in some detail how the Iraqis had run a bedeviling system of concealment and evasion that make any pledges of compliance difficult to accept at face value.

The experts repeated some of their testimony at a news conference this evening.

Using photographs made by an American U-2 aircraft, Charles Duelfer, Mr. Butler's deputy, showed that a convoy of trucks had been seen entering and leaving a factory near the Baghdad airport after inspectors had indicated that it was a site they wished to visit.

Since last year, Mr. Duelfer said, the inspectors asked to see eight sites where they suspected that material had been moved or hidden after the Iraqis were notified that a visit was planned.

Mr. Duelfer said the inspectors had been delayed at or denied entry to 83 percent of what **Iraq** had declared to be "sensitive" sites usually associated with one of those agencies.

"No one doubts **Iraq's** right to defend itself," Mr. Butler said at the news conference. But he added that such obstructions would only prolong the embargo that had crippled the Iraqi economy, an embargo that could not be lifted until all of **Iraq's** weapons of mass destruction were eliminated.

"We can't get to the end of that task unless **Iraq** lets us in," he said.

Mr. Butler added that he would say to the Iraqis that "all the world community is trying to have you back as a member." Virtually all nations are subject to monitoring, he said, but few have the kind of weapons **Iraq** insists on making.

As an example of how **Iraq** has changed its accounting, Horst Reeps, a German chemical weapons expert, said that in 1995, **Iraq admitted** to having made 160 kilograms of **VX** nerve agent. **VX** enters the body through the skin, cutting off nerve transmissions, and eventually causing victims to stop breathing. Then **Iraq** altered its figures, first to admit making 240 kilograms of **VX**, then 1,250 kilograms. By June 1996 the Iraqis acknowledged producing at least 3.9 tons.

Similarly, said Richard Spertzel, an American expert, the Iraqis denied making botulism toxins until 1995, when they **admitted** having produced 19,000 liters. Baghdad said it had made 600 liters of anthrax, but later **admitted** to 6,000 liters and finally 8,400.

While Council members made an effort today to put a united face on their resolve to have President

Hussein back down and allow inspection teams to return on the commission's terms, with no stipulations as to nationality, there still are differences not far below the surface here.

In comments to reporters during a break in a daylong session, Sergey Lavrov, Russia's representative on the Council, continued to put the emphasis on speeding up the disarmament process. He said all diplomatic efforts, including those of Russia, were aimed at allowing the Special Commission to "resume unconditionally and in full" its activities in **Iraq**.

But he added that inspections needed to be accelerated so that Security Council conditions could be met and sanctions lifted.

Sir John Weston, Britain's representative, said that if inspections had not been carried out as expeditiously as some would have liked, that was not the fault of the commission.

"The primary reason for that is lack of cooperation from the Government of **Iraq**," he said. "Of course there is room for speeding them up. If we had had cooperation all along, we wouldn't be asking ourselves these questions six and a half years after the event."

Bill Richardson, the United States representative, told reporters that in important areas, the commission, known as Unscm, "is not in a position to say that it has all the information it needs."

The Security Council also heard a report from a nuclear expert representing the International Atomic Energy Agency, which conducts separate monitoring programs in **Iraq**. Again, the Council was told that there were still questions left unanswered about a potential nuclear arms program.

"All of the speakers were in agreement about several things," Mr. Richardson said. "First, that **Iraq** has concealed the truth and that Iraqi weapons of mass destruction continue to pose a grave threat. Unscm and the I.A.E.A. continue to need to be able to conduct intrusive inspections and maintain their long-term monitoring capability to be able some day to be sure that **Iraq** no longer poses the threat it is trying so hard to retain."

Russia, France and China have pressed the Council for a quicker accounting, and thereby a lifting of sanctions, because they have commercial interests in **Iraq**.

Mr. Lavrov, the Russian representative, defended these economic interests but added that this argued only for a swifter, more efficient disarmament process, not a premature end to sanctions.

He acknowledged after the briefing that the prognosis did not look very good. "As we suspected, the effects are not very encouraging," he said of the break in inspections. "We have to resume monitoring as soon as possible."

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